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Introduction 
Concerns over agency costs dominate corporate law.1 The central 
challenge is ensuring that directors act in the corporation’s best interests, 
rather than their own best interests.2 Shareholder litigation is a key tool in 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., 
Harvard Law School.  
 1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 
(1999) (“It is difficult to overstate the influence that the principal-agent approach has had on 
modern thinking about business organizations.”).  
 2. See Steven M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 785-86 (2006) (noting that “agency costs are the inevitable 
consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the residual claimant” and that “[a] 
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controlling these agency costs.3 If directors cross the line, the law provides 
an array of litigation options that shareholders can use to hold directors 
accountable. Shareholders can file securities class actions if directors lie to 
them.4 They can file shareholder derivative suits if directors engage in 
egregious misconduct.5 And they can file lawsuits under both state and 
federal law if directors try to sell the company at too low of a price or 
without adequate disclosures.6  
Shareholder litigation, however, has agency costs of its own.7 Most 
shareholder plaintiffs lack sufficient incentives to closely monitor these 
lawsuits.8 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys can make litigation decisions that 
benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholder clients.9 This concern 
arises in nearly all types of shareholder litigation—from shareholder 
derivative suits to securities class actions and merger cases.10 Regardless of 
                                                                                                                 
complete theory of the firm therefore requires one to balance the virtues of discretion against 
the need to require that discretion be used responsibly”).  
 3. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting 
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 118 (2006) (“In theory, 
directors are accountable to shareholders through derivative lawsuits, shareholder voting, 
and the invisible hand of the market.”). 
 4. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). 
 5. See Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Recognizing, 
however, that directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to 
the corporation for their own wrongdoing, courts of equity have created an ingenious device 
to police the activities of corporate fiduciaries: the shareholder’s derivative suit.”).  
 6. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing 
the legal landscape of merger class actions).  
 7. See, e.g., David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An 
Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative 
Suits, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 923 (2014) (“But litigation to enforce these rights generates 
costs of its own, including agency costs created by the disconnect between the interests of 
plaintiffs' lawyers and those of the shareholder class they represent.”).  
 8. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (attributing high agency costs in class action and 
derivative litigation primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the 
attorneys); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for 
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 45 (2002) (“Common to all agency 
problems is their correlation with the asymmetry of information between the principal and 
the agent. The less the principal is informed, the higher the agency costs will be.”). 
 9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).  
 10. See infra Part II.  
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the underlying law, shareholder litigation faces a common need for a 
gatekeeper. 
Yet, despite this shared problem, different types of shareholder litigation 
use very different gatekeepers to solve it. In securities class actions, 
Congress put its trust in institutional investors, hoping that their significant 
financial stake in these lawsuits would lead them to exercise greater control 
over their attorneys.11 In derivative suits, the law places its faith in 
corporate boards, who can use special procedural devices to take control of 
suits filed in the corporation’s name.12 And in merger cases, the law relies 
on greater oversight by judges in their review of settlements coupled with 
greater power for corporations to screen these lawsuits ex ante in their 
bylaws and charters.13  
There are good reasons for these differences. In securities class actions, 
the plaintiffs are often large institutions, which are uniquely suited to 
monitor these claims.14 Derivative suits are filed on behalf of corporations, 
not shareholders,15 so it makes sense to give corporate boards a voice in 
how these cases are litigated. And when it comes to merger cases, Delaware 
judges are motivated to exercise special oversight over these cases because 
they can threaten Delaware’s dominance over state corporate law.16 
Different gatekeepers, in other words, make sense.  
None of the gatekeepers in these areas, however, have solved all of the 
problems in shareholder litigation. Institutional investors have cut down on 
some of the abuses in securities class actions, but created others.17 
Corporate boards are often motivated to protect their own interests in 
derivative suits, rather than the interests of plaintiff corporations.18 And 
Delaware judges have been unable to stop merger cases from fleeing to 
other jurisdictions to escape their scrutiny.19 By viewing each type of 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).  
 12. See infra Section II.C.  
 13. See infra Section II.B.  
 14. See LAARNI T. BULAN ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS: 2015 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 16 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publi 
cations/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2015-Review-and-Analysis (noting that 
a majority of securities class actions are filed today are filed by institutional investors).  
 15. See La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 330 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(holding that it is a “legal truism that the underlying claim in a derivative action belongs to 
the corporation”). 
 16. See infra Section II.B.  
 17. See infra Section II.A.  
 18. See infra Section II.C.  
 19. See infra Section II.B.  
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shareholder litigation as its own discrete problem, the legal system has 
missed an opportunity to learn broader lessons about the role of gatekeepers 
in shareholder litigation.  
This Article examines gatekeepers through a wider lens. Given that no 
single gatekeeper is perfect, the legal system should look for ways to use a 
greater mix of gatekeepers in shareholder litigation. First, judges should 
take the enhanced scrutiny used in merger cases and apply it in derivative 
suits and securities class actions—areas where settlements have 
traditionally received only cursory review from judges. Second, corporate 
boards should have a greater role in shaping procedural rules through bylaw 
and charter provisions, subject to judicial and market scrutiny to ensure that 
boards are not misusing this power. Finally, legislatures should adopt 
heightened procedures, where appropriate, to better identify meritorious 
cases at an early stage of the proceedings.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the common need 
for gatekeepers in shareholder litigation. Part II describes the different types 
of gatekeepers used in different types of shareholder lawsuits. Part III takes 
a broader view of gatekeeping in shareholder litigation, exploring how 
gatekeeping lessons can be applied across different types of lawsuits. In the 
end, as we will see, gatekeeping is too important to be left to any single 
group. 
I. The Need for Gatekeepers in Shareholder Litigation 
Shareholder litigation is designed to combat one type of agency costs, 
but, in the process, it has created an entirely different type. While corporate 
law is primarily concerned with mitigating the agency costs between 
shareholders and corporate managers,20 debates about shareholder litigation 
revolve around how best to mitigate the agency costs between shareholders 
and their attorneys.21 This Part I explains those agency costs generally and 
then discusses how they play out in different types of shareholder lawsuits. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 86-88 (describing the agency costs that result 
from a separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation); Edward B. Rock, 
Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2013) 
(“The separation of ownership and control has been the master problem of U.S. corporate 
law since the days of Berle and Means, if not before.”).  
 21. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining 
Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 22 (2016) 
(“[T]he benefits created by [shareholder litigation] are qualified by the litigation agency 
costs that surround them.”). 
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Agency costs exist in all types of lawsuits. Whether the case is a 
multimillion-dollar securities class action or a run-of-the-mill negligence 
case, there is always a concern that a lawyer will act in his or her own best 
interests rather than in the interests of the client.22 In most cases, however, 
these agency costs are controlled in two ways. First, a client can monitor his 
or her attorney’s decisions, questioning those that do not appear to be in the 
client’s best interests and ultimately firing the attorney if the client’s wishes 
are not followed.23 Second, in contingency cases, the attorney’s interests are 
typically aligned with the client’s interests.24 If, for example, the victim of 
an auto accident agrees to pay her attorney thirty percent of the recovery, 
both the victim and her attorney benefit from a higher recovery. Their 
interests are aligned, reducing the agency costs in the suit.  
Shareholder lawsuits are different. Most shareholder lawsuits are 
representative suits, which means that a shareholder plaintiff represents the 
real parties in interest in the suits.25 In securities and merger class actions, 
the real party in interest is a much larger class of shareholders,26 while in 
derivative suits, it is the corporation that was allegedly injured by the 
misconduct of its directors or officers.27 The representative nature of these 
suits means that the real parties in interest are not directly involved in the 
litigation and are therefore limited in their ability to monitor or control their 
attorneys. 
In theory, the representative shareholder will monitor these lawsuits.28 In 
practice, however, this monitoring function is limited because most 
representative shareholders lack the necessary incentives to monitor the 
suit.29 There is no minimum ownership requirement to file a shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 3, 8. 
 23. See id. at 8−9. 
 24. See id. at 17−18. 
 25. See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder 
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015) (“[M]ost 
shareholder litigation is representative litigation, brought by a single shareholder or group of 
shareholders on behalf of an interest common to all.”). 
 26. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 15.1 (1986). 
 27. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (“In [a derivative 
suit] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation . . . . [A]ny damages recovered . . . are 
paid to the corporation.” (quoting CLARK, supra note 26, at 639-40)); Jessica Erickson, 
Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 75, 81 (2008).  
 28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 49.  
 29. See id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
242 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:237 
 
 
lawsuit, so a shareholder representative could theoretically own as little as 
one share of stock in the relevant company.30 And, although many 
shareholder plaintiffs own more than one share, they may still not own a 
large enough stake to justify the costs of closely monitoring the litigation.31 
In other words, the shareholder plaintiff incurs all of the costs of monitoring 
the attorney, but receives only a fraction of the benefits. 
These mismatched incentives increase the agency costs in shareholder 
lawsuits in two related ways. First, they create an incentive for attorneys to 
file lawsuits that may not be in their clients’ best interests.32 In typical 
negligence lawsuits, clients will only seek an attorney and authorize a 
lawsuit if they believe that the suit would be in their best interests.33 In 
contrast, in shareholder lawsuits, the real parties in interest (i.e., the entire 
class of shareholders in a class action or the plaintiff corporation in a 
derivative suit) do not decide whether to file the suit. Instead, this decision 
is made by representative shareholders and their attorneys.34 And once the 
suit is filed, the real parties in interest are extremely limited in their ability 
to control the course of the litigation.35 As a result, suits may be filed that 
have a positive value to their attorneys, but do not ultimately benefit the 
shareholders or the plaintiff corporation.  
Second, reduced monitoring in shareholder litigation can increase agency 
costs by allowing attorneys to seek a higher percentage of the recovery for 
their fee. To understand this point, imagine a shareholder lawsuit in which 
the defendants agree to pay $1 million to the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs’ 
attorney receives twenty-five percent of the recovery, the attorney will walk 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 21, at 22 (“Litigation agency costs arise because 
suits are often brought by a named plaintiff that has no substantial ownership interest in the 
corporation.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
 31. See id.  
 32. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 17.  
 33. See Anthony Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1492 
(2007) (reviewing WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, 
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004), HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND 
REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), and TOM BAKER, 
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005)) (“A rational self-interested ‘investor’—  . . . the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer—would be incentivized to take steps to increase his client’s expected return, 
since he now owns part of that return.”). 
 34. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 21 (“The attorneys themselves are responsible 
for initiating the litigation and do not rely on clients to come to them with cases.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Kossoff, Director Independence and Derivative Suit 
Settlements, 1983 DUKE L.J. 645, 657 (“Although the derivative plaintiff is the party that 
initiates the suit, courts routinely approve derivative settlements over the plaintiff’s 
vehement objection.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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away with $250,000 and the shareholder class will receive $750,000, with 
the shareholder representative receiving his pro rata share of this amount. 
But what would stop the plaintiffs’ attorney from seeking a greater 
percentage of the recovery, say thirty percent?36 The defendants should not 
care—they pay the same amount either way, so it should not matter to them 
how this amount is divided between the plaintiffs’ attorney and the class.37 
The shareholder representative should theoretically be monitoring the case, 
but as discussed above, many shareholder plaintiffs do not have the 
financial incentives to do the type of detailed monitoring required to 
prevent marginally higher fees.  
It is one thing for the plaintiffs’ attorney to seek a higher percentage of 
the recovery. But there are other, even more egregious possibilities. For 
example, the defendant and the plaintiffs’ attorney could conspire to craft a 
settlement that benefits both of them at the expense of the absent class 
members.38 Instead of the $1 million settlement outlined above, what if the 
defendant offered $900,000, but agreed to look the other way if the 
plaintiffs’ attorney sought forty percent of the recovery? In this case, the 
settlement would be in the defendants’ interests because they would pay 
less, and it would be in the attorney’s interest because he or she would 
receive more.39 The only people who would be hurt by this settlement are 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit 
and Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 389 (1994) (arguing that the interests 
of shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys “may conflict since the fee award comes out of 
the damage recovery so that any increase in the fee award necessarily leads to a decrease in 
plaintiffs’ recovery”). 
 37. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 25−26 (“Defendants in common benefit and 
fee-shifting cases typically wish to minimize the sum of three costs: the costs of the relief on 
the merits, the costs of their own attorney’s fees, and the costs of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s 
fees. Defendants are typically indifferent about how the total cost of litigation is distributed 
among these elements.”).  
 38. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of 
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 232 (1983) (“The 
possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion to the attorney’s 
‘independence’ from his client. . . . To say this is not to claim that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
systematically subordinate the class recovery to their own fee, but it is to say that the 
plaintiff’s attorney is subject to a serious conflict of interest.”); Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting 
Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class Actions and 
Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 124 (1998) (“There is always the possibility that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys will conspire with the defendants to exchange a small settlement for a 
large award of attorneys’ fees.”). 
 39. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 26 (“Thus the conditions are present for a 
bargain under which the plaintiffs’ attorneys agree to a lower overall settlement on the 
merits of the litigation in exchange for a higher fee.”). 
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the shareholders who receive significantly less than they otherwise would 
have. 
The defendants might try an even bolder strategy. Instead of offering $1 
million or even $900,000, they might offer no money at all to the plaintiffs. 
Instead, they might put on the table what is known as a “non-monetary 
settlement,” or a settlement that includes consideration other than money.40 
In this instance, the defendants will probably still have to pay some money 
to the plaintiffs’ attorney in fees, but the overall cost to the defendants will 
be much less than if they had to pay both the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ 
attorney. And, depending on the amount of the fees and the upfront costs to 
litigate, the plaintiffs’ attorney may end up with more money in his or her 
pockets as well.  
This last example is not as far-fetched as it may sound. Non-monetary 
settlements are surprisingly common in shareholder litigation.41 Until 
approximately 2015, nearly all merger class actions ended with non-
monetary settlements, with the consideration of additional disclosures to 
shareholders about the merger.42 And despite the non-monetary nature of 
the settlements, the plaintiffs’ attorneys still received six-figure fees, 
averaging $500,000 in these cases.43 Similarly, in shareholder derivative 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 716 (“The availability of these bloodless settlements 
gives rise to a set of circumstances in which it can appear economically irrational not to 
settle. By settling, neither side loses anything, and both recoup their legal expenses from the 
corporation (and thus indirectly from the shareholders).”). 
 41. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: 
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) (“In 
most settled cases, the only relief provided to shareholders consists of supplemental 
disclosures in the merger proxy statement. In compensation for the benefit produced by these 
settlements--often worth no more, in the words of a famous jurist, than a ‘peppercorn’—
plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee award.” (footnote omitted)). 
 42. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 5 (2015), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review 
[hereinafter KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014]; RAV SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 
AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 5 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/ 
Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.  
 43. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SETTLEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS—REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION, at 
3 (2014), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Settlements-of-M-and-A-
Shareholder-Litigation [hereinafter KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2013]; see also Matthew D. Cain 
& Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and 
Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 479 (2015) (“The average attorneys’ fees for disclosures 
[between 2005-2011] are $749,000, considerably lower than other settlement types. This 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/7
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suits, plaintiff corporations—the real parties in interest in these suits—often 
agree to settle the derivative claims in exchange for making relatively 
modest changes to their corporate governance practices.44  
In theory, non-monetary settlements might have value.45 There may well 
be situations in which additional disclosures or corporate governance 
reforms may be more valuable to the plaintiffs than money.46 Yet, they also 
raise a risk that attorneys and defendants may benefit themselves at the 
expense of the shareholders or the plaintiff corporation.47 And numerous 
empirical studies have found that these settlements often offer little value to 
plaintiffs, illustrating that these settlements can be abused by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.48 As a result, whatever theoretical value these types of 
settlements might have, they seem to have less value in practice.  
Bringing the analysis full circle, in most areas of the law, the legal 
system does not worry about the merits of settlements. Instead, it trusts 
plaintiffs to monitor their attorneys and ensure that any agreed-upon 
settlements reflect their best interests. In shareholder litigation, however, 
the plaintiffs are often absent class members who lack the financial 
incentives to closely monitor the litigation. As a result, the legal system 
cannot rely on them to ensure that these suits are litigated in a way that 
reflects the best interests. Instead, they must rely on different gatekeepers. 
As we will see, however, these gatekeepers are not the same across 
different types of shareholder lawsuits. 
                                                                                                                 
supports the principle put forth by some that ‘disclosure only’ settlements are not highly 
valued by the litigant participants or the courts.”). 
 44. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (analyzing corporate governance settlements 
in derivative suits filed in federal court).  
 45. See id. (discussing analytical frameworks to evaluate the benefits of non-monetary 
settlements); Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 570 (“Disclosure-only settlements can benefit the 
shareholder class if the required disclosures allow the shareholders to exercise their voting 
rights in a more meaningful manner.”). 
 46. See Erickson, supra note 44 (explaining how non-monetary settlements might cure 
an underlying governance problem at the corporation that led to the problems challenged in 
the suit).  
 47. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 94-95. 
 48. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1755 (explaining that “corporate governance 
settlements often fail to live up to their potential because they include reforms that are 
unlikely to benefit corporations or their shareholders”); Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 561 
(“[D]isclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way. We 
also find only weak evidence that consideration-increase settlements increase shareholder 
voting in favor of a transaction.”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
246 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:237 
 
 
II. The Diverse Gatekeepers in Shareholder Litigation 
Part I explained how different types of shareholder lawsuits all face the 
same challenge in ensuring that plaintiffs’ attorneys make litigation 
decisions that are in the plaintiffs’ best interests. Yet in the three main types 
of representative shareholder lawsuits—securities class actions, merger 
suits, and derivative suits—each choose different gatekeepers to monitor 
the attorneys’ conduct. This Part II explains the different gatekeepers in 
these lawsuits, as well as the pros and cons of each.  
A. Securities Class Actions 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”),49 which overhauled the procedural rules governing securities 
class actions. Pursuant to the PSLRA, there are now two primary 
gatekeepers in securities class actions: lead plaintiffs and Congress. The 
subsections below discuss the PSLRA’s effectiveness in reducing agency 
costs in securities class actions.  
1. Lead Plaintiffs 
One of the PSLRA’s primary goals was to increase the role of large, 
institutional shareholders.50 Prior to 1995, if multiple shareholders filed 
parallel suits, courts had significant discretion to decide which shareholder 
would oversee the litigation.51 The PSLRA significantly limited that 
discretion, creating a presumption that the lead plaintiff should be the 
shareholder applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.52 The 
PSLRA also requires the lead plaintiff, “subject to the approval of the court, 
[to] select and retain counsel to represent the class.”53  
According to the legislative history, this provision was designed to 
increase the role of institutional plaintiffs in securities class actions.54 The 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) 
(2012). 
 50. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995) (“The Committee intends to increase the 
likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-
369, at 34 (1995) (“The Conference Committee seeks to increase the likelihood that 
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs . . . .”). 
 51. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE 
L.J. 2053, 2062 (1995) (“Courts most often appoint as lead counsel the lawyer who files the 
first complaint.”). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).  
 53. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
 54. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995). 
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idea was that institutional investors with large financial stakes in the 
litigation would monitor the cases more closely than smaller shareholders.55 
In many ways, the PSLRA has succeeded in this goal. Approximately two-
thirds of settled cases have at least one institutional investor as lead 
plaintiff.56 These institutions are largely labor unions and public pension 
funds, rather than the mutual funds envisioned by Congress,57 but they 
nonetheless tend to have substantial stakes in the outcome of the lawsuits.  
Overall, these institutional investors have succeeded in lowering the fees 
of their attorneys. One study, for example, found that cases in which state 
pension funds serve as lead plaintiff result in lower attorneys’ fees as a 
percentage of the total recovery than cases in which an individual served as 
lead plaintiff.58 Additionally, larger funds negotiate for even lower fees.59 
These findings confirm Congress’s intuition that institutional investors have 
greater incentives to protect absent class members.  
And the reliance on institutional investors as gatekeepers in these 
lawsuits makes sense. Unlike many other types of class actions, securities 
class actions typically end with multi-million-dollar settlements,60 and 
many class members have multimillion-dollar claims themselves.61 As a 
result, they have greater financial incentives to monitor the litigation than a 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or 
“Look What’s Happened to My Baby”, 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547 (2008) (stating that the 
PSLRA was based on research predicting that “if class action procedures could be reformed 
to make it easier for institutional investors with large losses to become lead plaintiffs and to 
select the attorneys who would represent the class, those institutions would have an 
economic incentive to retain and to monitor class counsel so as to reduce substantially the 
agency costs associated with securities class action litigation”). 
 56. See BULAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 16. 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34-35 (1995); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal 
Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (2011) (arguing that “because other eligible 
institutions like banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies maintain commercial 
relationships with the defendants or defendants’ customers, public and union pension funds 
are the institutions that typically take on the lead-plaintiff role”). 
 58. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 678 (2011) (“We also find that local pension funds, although 
generally having smaller stakes in class action recoveries, appear to negotiate lower fees 
than individuals.”). 
 59. See id. at 651 (“We also find that larger funds, of all types, tend to negotiate lower 
attorney fees.”). 
 60. See BULAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1 (finding that average settlement size of 
securities class actions in 2015 was $37.9 million).  
 61. See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do 
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
855, 855-65 (2002). 
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stereotypical class member with only a few dollars at stake.62 Framed 
another way, securities class actions may be one of the only types of class 
actions able to rely on lead plaintiffs to monitor the litigation because it is 
one of the only types of class actions with class members who have 
substantial financial stakes in the outcome. As a result, it is not surprising 
that securities class actions, unlike many other types of class actions, have 
put greater monitoring responsibilities on lead plaintiffs.  
On the other hand, the reliance on institutional shareholders has not 
cured all of the problems in securities class actions. First, the PSLRA did 
not mandate that large shareholders control all securities class actions. 
Instead, it only stated that, in most instances, the lead plaintiff should be the 
applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.63 If all applicants 
are individual shareholders with small holdings, the lead plaintiff will be 
selected from among this group. Indeed, post-PSLRA studies find that there 
is a subset of securities class actions that continues to be controlled by 
individual investors, and this subset, on the whole, tends to involve smaller, 
potentially more frivolous claims.64 
Moreover, as soon as the legal system gave institutional investors more 
power, it also created incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to curry favor with 
these investors. Most of the institutions that serve as lead plaintiff are 
pension funds,65 and most of these pension funds are controlled by 
politicians who often have to campaign to retain their current seat or have 
an eyes on other elected offices.66 Empirical evidence suggests that at least 
some of these firms make campaign contributions to these politicians in the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Weiss, supra note 55, at 574 (stating that “a class member with a considerable 
sum at stake was likely to be more committed than a court to ensuring that all claims 
asserted on behalf of the plaintiff class were prosecuted vigorously”). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). 
 64. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1620-22 
(2006) (finding that cases controlled by individuals or groups of individuals involve lead 
plaintiffs with small dollar value and respective stakes in the cases and therefore “[i]t seems 
apparent that these claimants cannot be realistically expected to engage in costly monitoring 
of class counsel”).  
 65. See BULAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (finding that approximately forty percent of 
settlements in securities class actions have involved a public pension fund as lead plaintiff).  
 66. See David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in 
Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2044-46 (2010).  
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hopes of inducing the funds that these politicians control to hire them as 
lead counsel.67  
For example, in Mississippi, the Attorney General oversees the state’s 
retirement system.68 Starting in 2004, plaintiffs’ firms started to make 
considerable donations to the Attorney General’s campaign, comprising 
approximately a significant percentage of the total contributions to his 
campaign from 2007 through 2009.69 These campaign contributions 
seemingly paid off. The same law firms that donated to his campaign were 
also chosen to serve as lead counsel or co-lead counsel in securities class 
actions in which the Mississippi retirement system served as one of the lead 
plaintiffs.70 Many of these cases ended with sizable settlements that resulted 
in substantial fees for the law firms.71 Mississippi is far from the only state 
subject to allegations that plaintiffs’ law firms must “pay to play” when it 
comes to pension funds’ selection of lead counsel.72  
This influence matters. As noted above, state pension funds generally 
bargain for lower attorneys’ fees in securities class actions than do 
individual investors.73 This fee differential, however, largely disappears 
when researchers control for campaign contributions made to candidates 
with influence over the pension funds. And this effect is particularly 
pronounced when it comes to the funds whose officials receive the largest 
campaign contributions and the funds that have a long-term relationship 
with a single firm.74 This data shows that, although we might expect that 
public pension funds that repeatedly rely on the same firm might bargain 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 58, at 653-54; Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Note, 
Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers’ Campaign Contributions, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1728 (2009). This point, however, is not without controversy. See, 
e.g., Webber, supra note 66, at 2044. 
 68. 2014 MISS. ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 81, http://www.ago.state.ms.us/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/12/AGO-FY2014-Annual-Report.pdf (“Special Assistant Attorney General 
Jane Mapp serve[d] as legal counsel to the Public Employees’ Retirement System of 
Mississippi (PERS). PERS is responsible for administering the Public Employees’ 
Retirement System . . . .”). 
 69. STEPHEN J. CHOI ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FREQUENT FILER: 
REPEAT PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 6-8 (2013), http://www.instituteforlegal 
reform.com/uploads/sites/1/FrequentFilers_FINAL.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 8.  
 71. Id. at 8−9. 
 72. Id. at 14 n.2 (explaining that states such as Louisiana, North Carolina, and 
Oklahoma face similar problems).  
 73. Choi et al., supra note 58, at 650. 
 74. See id. at 651. 
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for lower fees, in fact the opposite happens. Experience matters, but not in 
the way we might hope.  
More broadly, institutional investors have not exercised their new 
monitoring responsibilities as well or as creatively as lawmakers might 
have hoped. Although institutional investors are correlated with lower fees, 
empirical studies have found that this reduction does not result from ex ante 
bargaining between these investors and their lawyers, as Congress had 
hoped.75 Instead, in most cases, courts still set fees after the parties have 
agreed on a settlement.76 And this lack of bargaining has had a predictable 
impact on fees, with studies demonstrating that “courts in most cases set 
fees in precisely the same manner they did before passage of the PSLRA—
ex post, after a settlement has already been reached.”77 As a result, while 
fees have gone down, the reduction might not be as much as Congress had 
hoped.  
Pulling this analysis together, ever since the enactment of the PSLRA, 
securities class actions have relied on institutional investors to serve as 
monitors in securities class actions, and for good reason given that these 
institutions often have multimillion-dollar stakes in the litigation. And, on 
average, this reliance has paid off with lower attorneys’ fees, which means 
the class ends up with more money. But there are downsides to this reliance 
as well, as pay-to-play allegations demonstrate, and limits to what 
institutional investors have been able to accomplish. As we shall see, 
however, they are not the only monitors in securities class actions. 
Congress also claimed an important role for itself in the PSLRA.  
2. Congress 
When it came to tinkering with the rules governing securities class 
actions in the PSLRA, Congress did not stop with the lead plaintiff 
provisions described above. It also included heightened pleading 
requirements, which make it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion 
to dismiss and proceed to discovery. The PSLRA requires that, in any case 
in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a false or misleading 
fact (i.e., almost all securities class actions), the plaintiff must specify “each 
statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why 
the statement is misleading.”78 Moreover, “if an allegation regarding the 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Lynn A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in 
Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1379-80 (2015). 
 76. Id. at 1380.  
 77. Id.  
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/7
2017]        GATEKEEPERS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 251 
 
 
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint 
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”79 In 
addition, when it comes to allegations of scienter, or the defendant’s state of 
mind, the PSLRA requires that the plaintiff allege “with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”80 The PSLRA is one of the only federal statutes that relies 
on heightened pleading requirements to sort cases,81 and it is a significant 
break from the less stringent pleading requirements under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.82  
The PSLRA requires judges to dismiss a securities class action that does 
not comply with these heightened pleading requirements.83 At first glance, 
therefore, these provisions appear to give judges, rather than Congress, 
extra monitoring responsibility in securities class actions. And in many 
ways, judges do have more power because Congress deputized them to sort 
the good cases from the bad. Judges, in other words, are the monitors on the 
front lines, making the case-by-case decisions on whether specific claims 
meet the given pleading requirements.  
 But judges have always played this role, albeit usually under a different 
pleading standard. Regardless of whether securities class actions are 
governed by Rule 8, Rule 9, or the new pleading requirements of the 
PSLRA, judges must decide whether a given complaint meets the relevant 
pleading standard.84 And judges play this role in every case, or at least in 
every case where the defendant challenges the sufficiency of a pleading. 
The pleading standards may be different, but the role of judges in applying 
these standards is not. As a result, judges do play a monitoring role in 
securities class actions, but this role is not fundamentally different than in 
any other type of federal civil case.85  
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 81. See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 85-86 (2016). 
 82. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (establishing a notice pleading standard for most 
civil claims). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, the 
court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of 
paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.”). 
 84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  
 85. This is not to say that judges’ role in securities class actions is exactly the same. 
First, a heightened pleading standard may have an impact on how judges approach the case 
and see their own role. As scholars have noted, judges use heuristics to evaluate claims on a 
motion to dismiss, and they may see their own role differently when they are asked by 
Congress to use a more skeptical eye. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. 
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The role of Congress, however, is different. In the PSLRA, Congress 
claimed for itself a greater gatekeeper role to sort the good cases from the 
bad. In most types of federal cases, Congress sits back and lets the normal 
Rule 8 pleading standards do their work. In securities class actions, 
however, Congress intervened, making ex ante decisions about the types of 
cases that should survive. Congress, in other words, is the ultimate 
decision-maker in these cases, crafting the standard that is then used in 
federal courts across the country in deciding motions to dismiss.  
So how has Congress performed in this gatekeeping role? The empirical 
evidence is decidedly mixed. The PSLRA succeeded in reducing the 
number of frivolous cases, exactly the result that Congress wanted.86 Yet it 
also reduced the number of non-frivolous cases, especially those in which 
there is no hard evidence of fraud, such as a restatement or SEC 
enforcement action.87 As one study concluded, “the PSLRA operated less 
like a selective deterrence against fraud and more as a simple tax on all 
litigation (including meritorious suits).”88 As a result, Congress may have 
inserted itself into securities class actions, but it cannot argue that it has 
been an especially effective gatekeeper. 
B. Merger Class Actions 
Merger class actions have faced even greater agency cost challenges than 
securities class actions, and these challenges have been addressed in 
radically different ways. In 2014, approximately ninety-three percent of 
large mergers and acquisitions were challenged in court.89 Whatever one 
may think about corporate boards, it is hard to imagine that they breach 
their fiduciary duties nearly every time they approve a large merger or 
                                                                                                                 
DAVIS L. REV. 903, 946 (2002) (arguing that the rhetoric in decisions on motions to dismiss 
in securities class actions “arguably reveals that the courts are not simply applying pre-
PSLRA standards designed to sort the good cases from the bad” but instead are “disdainful 
of the plaintiffs’ attorneys before them and aggravated by the length and complexity of the 
complaints”).  
 86. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64-66 (2009). 
 87. Id.; see also Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive 
Compensation and Securities Litigation 4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Olin Research Paper 
No. 04-7, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536963 (presenting 
data “that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents claim), it likely 
deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp the deterring 
effects on non-meritorious suits”). 
 88. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 623 (2007). 
 89. See KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 1. 
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acquisition.90 Under significant pressure to protect the shareholder litigation 
franchise, Delaware and other states explored ways to reduce frivolous 
merger litigation. Rather than passing a PSLRA-style law, however, states 
have relied on two other gatekeepers—judges and the targeted companies 
themselves. This section examines how these gatekeepers came into power 
and their mixed success in exercising it.  
1. Judges 
Until fairly recently, judges did not have to worry about merger class 
actions. Shareholders would occasionally challenge a corporate board’s 
decision to merge or be acquired, especially if there was a controlling 
shareholder involved,91 but these cases did not raise serious agency cost 
concerns. Some of these cases were good, some were bad, but courts were 
largely able to tell the difference. 
This all changed over the last several years. Between 2007 and 2014, the 
percentage of large mergers acquisitions challenged in court increased from 
forty-four percent to ninety-three percent.92 There does not appear to have 
been a single event that precipitated this change,93 but regardless of the 
cause, lawyers figured out that these cases were relatively easy money. 
Traditionally, a shareholder challenging a merger or acquisition would 
allege that the price was too low or the terms too onerous.94 This type of 
claim would require wrangling about the actual value of the company and, 
if the plaintiffs were successful, would typically end with a higher deal 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate Norms Can 
Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 505 (2016) (arguing that the 
prevalence of deal litigation provides “ample reason to believe that more is afoot in 
corporate litigation than an abundance of potential wrongdoing”). 
 91. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
 92. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 1. 
 93. See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: 
Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2012) (“Many 
believe, for example, that the advent of multi-jurisdictional litigation was a reaction by the 
plaintiffs’ bar to certain unfavorable rulings in Delaware from a stockholder point of 
view.”); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1753, 1769 (2012) (arguing that the PSLRA contributed to the rise of merger litigation in 
part because the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provisions mean that “[n]ewer, smaller firms with 
fewer financial resources will only be able to enter the market if they find niches where they 
can litigate what they perceive as good cases without investing large amounts of resources 
but still earn sufficient fees to stay in business”). 
 94. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-67 (1977). 
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price or altered deal terms. Defendants would fight these claims to avoid 
risking the merger and/or paying a significant cash settlement.95  
Shareholder plaintiffs (or their lawyers) realized more recently that they 
would have an easier time if they challenged a company’s disclosures about 
a merger, rather than the merger itself.96 If the plaintiffs alleged that the 
company’s disclosures were inadequate, then the company could fix the 
problem by making additional disclosures, rather than by paying money.97 
Most companies would rather make a few additional disclosures rather than 
re-negotiate the deal or pay millions in damages.98 And, even if the 
companies thought their existing disclosures were adequate, they would 
rather disclose a little more information about the deal than pay to fight the 
case and risk holding up the deal.  
As a result, more and more merger cases now end with the prototypical, 
non-monetary settlements discussed in Part I. In 2014, only eight percent of 
the settlements in merger cases involved cash consideration, while nearly 
eighty percent included additional disclosures or other non-monetary 
changes to the deal terms.99 The average fees resulting from these 
settlements were approximately half a million dollars.100 This relatively 
easy money prompted lawsuits of most deals in more than one jurisdiction, 
as multiple lawyers tried to get a piece of the litigation pie. It became 
                                                                                                                 
 95. This is not to say that these settlements were utterly different from the settlements 
we see today. Corporations could make relatively minor changes to the terms of the deal to 
settle the case, later bringing in the plaintiffs to bless the changes and give them their 
release, a move that the Delaware Court of Chancery called a “Kabuki dance.” See In re 
Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010). This pattern was thus a 
precursor to the disclosure-only settlements that would soon follow.  
 96. See Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 564-65 (“Although the courts have long 
recognized that the board in a merger is responsible for providing shareholders with 
sufficient information to approve or reject the transaction on an informed basis, the 
suggestion that directors have an independent duty of disclosure and that directors can 
breach that duty by failing to provide shareholders with information material to the vote is of 
recent vintage.” (footnote omitted)). 
 97. See Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 669, 686-87 (2013) (“[M]uch of the improved disclosure can be attributed, at least in 
part, to the disclosure-only line of cases.”). 
 98. Cf. Cox, supra note 90, at 510 (“[D]isclosure-only settlements are an efficient 
medium for addressing deal litigation: the defense lawyers’ clients are happy, and the 
plaintiffs’ counsel are paid.”). 
 99. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 5. 
 100. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2013, supra note 43, at 1. 
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commonplace for corporations to pay a “deal tax” to plaintiffs’ attorneys 
every time they entered into a large merger or acquisition.101  
There was no PSLRA that could solve this problem. These cases were 
filed under state law, often in state court. The federal government could 
preempt state law or provide an exclusive forum for these cases in federal 
court,102 but doing so would upset the traditional role of states in corporate 
law, especially Delaware, given the significant percentage of companies 
incorporated there.103 As a result, the federal government had a limited 
ability to solve the problem. Instead, the responsibility rested with states, 
and more specifically Delaware courts, to address the problems that these 
cases raised. 
For several years, judges in Delaware decried the developments in 
merger litigation.104 In January 2015, however, Delaware took action, 
rejecting a non-monetary settlement in a merger class action filed against 
Trulia, Inc.105 This case challenged Zillow, Inc.’s acquisition of Trulia, Inc. 
on the grounds that Trulia’s board had failed to properly value the 
company.106 Although the plaintiffs challenged the deal terms, they agreed 
to settle the claims in exchange for additional disclosures about the deal.107  
In rejecting the settlement, Chancellor Bouchard roundly criticized 
merger litigation more generally. He stated that “far too often such 
litigation serves no useful purpose for stockholders.”108 The Chancellor 
continued: 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See K. Tyler O’Connell et al., Reducing the “Deal Tax”: Delaware’s Recent 
Scrutiny of Nonmonetary Settlements, BUS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2015, at 1.  
 102. Cf. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 
Stat. 3227, 3231 (preempting state securities class actions). 
 103. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription for the Peppercorn Settlement 
Problem in Merger Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 129, 132 (2015) (arguing against 
“radical surgery on Delaware corporate law by removing the entire subject of transaction-
related disclosure”). 
 104. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Request for Attorneys’ Fees and the 
Court’s Rulings at 73-74, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. No. 7930-VCL (Del. Ch. 
July 8, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/07/acevedovaeroflex-
settlementhearingtranscript.pdf (refusing to approve the intergalactic releases that have been 
previously accepted by the courts); Transcript of Settlement Hearing Rulings of the Court at 
73, In re Aruba Networks, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015), http:// 
www.dandodiary.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/265/2015/10/Aruba-Networks-Transcript.pdf. 
 105. In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 907-08 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 106. Id. at 889.  
 107. Id. at 887. 
 108. Id. at 891-92.  
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Instead, it serves only to generate fees for certain lawyers who 
are regular players in the enterprise of routinely filing hastily 
drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of the 
public announcement of a deal and settling quickly on terms that 
yield no monetary compensation to the stockholders they 
represent.109  
He announced that the court would “reexamine[]” its “historical 
predisposition toward approving disclosure settlements.”110 He also 
promised that the court would “disfavor” disclosure-only settlements that 
do not involve “plainly material” information.111 
Since the Trulia decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery has largely 
stayed true to its word. It has rejected several settlements,112 and a few 
courts in other jurisdictions have followed suit.113 The fallout from Trulia 
has been both positive and negative. On the positive side, the percentage of 
large mergers and acquisitions that were challenged in court was down 
precipitously—from a high of ninety-four percent in 2013 to sixty-four 
percent in the first half of 2016.114 On the negative side, Trulia did not 
completely solve the problem of frivolous merger litigation.115 Although it 
reduced the incidence of this litigation, it is still hard to imagine that 
corporate boards breach their fiduciary duty in nearly two-thirds of large 
mergers and acquisitions. And in the suits that remain, non-disclosure 
settlements remain common.116  
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 896. 
 111. Id. at 898. 
 112. See Edward Micheletti et al., Trulia’s Impact on Deal Litigation in Delaware and 
Beyond, LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2016, 9:47 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/864466/ 
trulia-s-impact-on-deal-litigation-in-delaware-and-beyond (“Disclosure-based settlements 
before the Court of Chancery have fallen out of favor.”). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016); 
Vergiev v. Aguero, et al., No. L-2776-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016). But see Corwin v. British 
Am. Tobacco PLC, No. 14 CVS 8130, 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016) 
(approving the partial settlement despite counsel’s objection that Trulia should be 
considered). 
 114. SINHA, supra note 42, at 1. 
 115. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix 
the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., forthcoming 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855950 (describing the limitations of 
Trulia).  
 116. See SINHA, supra note 42, at 1 (finding that post-Trulia “monetary consideration 
paid to shareholders has remained relatively rare”). 
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Trulia has also incentivized plaintiffs to try their chances outside of 
Delaware. A few courts have adopted Trulia,117 but others have not, 
continuing to approve disclosure-only settlements.118 And even in the 
jurisdictions that have adopted Trulia, plaintiffs may think their chances 
under the “plainly material” standard are better outside of Delaware. As a 
result, the forum shopping that plagued merger litigation before Trulia 
continues.119  
This impact shows the difficulty of relying on judges as the primary 
monitors in shareholder lawsuits. These lawsuits can often be filed in more 
than one jurisdiction. As a result, if one court starts to crack down, plaintiffs 
can just move to other jurisdictions that are less attuned to the problems. 
Given the costs of litigating a merger case to conclusion, it may be cheaper 
for plaintiffs to file outside of Delaware and the defendants not to fight the 
choice of forum and simply agree to nuisance settlements.  
Moreover, the Trulia approach depends on judges with the knowledge 
and incentives to act as strict monitors. The Delaware Court of Chancery 
judges are experts in Delaware corporate law and were well-aware of the 
rising problems in merger litigation.120 They are also presumably motivated 
to protect the shareholder litigation franchise and protect the court’s 
reputation as the overseer of corporate litigation. And yet even with their 
knowledge and incentives, it still took them several years to crack down on 
a situation that everyone agreed had gotten out of hand, and even now they 
have not been able to completely solve the problem.  
Few other courts face similar knowledge or incentives. A federal judge, 
for example, may handle a securities class action occasionally, but is 
unlikely to be an expert in all the ins and outs of these cases.121 If a 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See, e.g., Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725 (adopting the “plainly material” standard from 
Trulia in an opinion by Judge Posner on the Seventh Circuit); Vergiev v. Aguero, No. L-
2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 6, 2016). 
 118. See, e.g., In re Sigma-Aldrich Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 1422-CC09684 (Mo. Cir. 
Ct. Aug. 19, 2015) (approving the disclosure-only settlement); see also Murphy v. 
Synergetics USA Inc., No. 1511-CC00778 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2016). 
 119. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 2 (arguing that the belief that Trulia would solve the 
problems in merger litigation appear to be “wishful thinking”).  
 120. See, e.g., Laster, supra note 103, at 134 (“The Delaware courts are different. The 
Court of Chancery’s jurisdiction is focused. It does not hear criminal cases, and a substantial 
majority of the court’s caseload concerns mergers and other transactions.”). 
 121. See id. at 133 (“[F]ederal courts hear disclosure cases within a broader docket that 
encompasses criminal cases, lawsuits invoking myriad other federal statutes, and state law 
diversity actions. Docket composition varies across districts, so while it may well be that 
judges in the Southern District of New York and other commercial centers have developed 
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shareholder lawsuit is simply one more case on a judge’s docket, it is 
unlikely that the judge will know about the specific problems in those types 
of suits or devote the time necessary to try to solve them. And even if one 
judge takes on this effort, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of other 
judges will join the effort and thus have a meaningful impact across the 
legal system.  
Indeed, any excitement that one might get from Trulia must be tempered 
by the PSLRA’s failure to make judges more active monitors in securities 
class actions. In addition to the provisions described above, the PSLRA also 
mandates that judges conduct a Rule 11 inquiry at the end of every 
securities class action.122 Yet, despite the mandatory nature of this 
provision, federal judges are largely ignoring it. A recent empirical study 
found that judges conduct this “mandatory” review in only fourteen percent 
of the cases.123 And even in these cases, their review is typically 
perfunctory.124 This experience suggests that it is not always easy to get 
judges to serve as more active monitors. Delaware aside, most judges 
simply do not have the time or inclination to actively monitor shareholder 
lawsuits.  
As we shall see, however, Delaware is not relying on judges alone to 
solve the merger litigation crisis. It has also deputized corporations and 
their shareholders to police these suits through ex ante restrictions in their 
governing documents. 
2. Bylaws and Charters 
Corporate law has long allowed corporations to alter default rules in their 
charters and bylaws.125 It is therefore surprising that it took corporations 
                                                                                                                 
takeover-disclosure expertise, it is not clear that such a claim can be made about the federal 
court system as a whole.”). 
 122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, 
upon final adjudication of the action, the court shall include in the record specific findings 
regarding compliance by each party and each attorney representing any party with each 
requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint, 
responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.”). 
 123. See M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with 
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 587, 590 (2015). 
 124. See id. at 599 (stating that “consistent with our results based on proxies for effort or 
motivation—that a judge will do so only when the effort involved is minimal”). 
 125. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008) 
(holding that shareholders can amend bylaws to change the “process and procedures by 
which [corporate] decisions are made”).  
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until recently to use this power to address frivolous shareholder lawsuits. In 
2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery publicly acknowledged that it was 
having difficulty policing merger cases because parties could just settle the 
suit in other jurisdictions to avoid the court’s oversight.126 The court 
suggested that defendants could avoid litigating in other jurisdictions by 
including a forum selection clause in their charters, stating that all intra-
corporate disputes must be filed in Delaware.127  
Many corporations follow the court’s suggestions, especially those that 
were already amending their governing documents before announcing a 
merger. These corporations were able to include a forum selection clause in 
their charters or bylaws before they were inevitably sued by shareholders 
upon announcement of a merger.128 Soon, corporations began to experiment 
by putting other heightened procedures into these documents, including fee-
shifting provisions.129 These provisions caused concern among 
shareholders’ and plaintiffs’ counsel because they made representative 
shareholders liable for all of the defendants’ fees if the suit was 
unsuccessful, even though these shareholders would only receive their pro 
rata shares of the recovery if the suit was successful.130 This combination of 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The 
limiting function of the defendants’ ability to seek dismissal, however, operates imperfectly 
when defendants can routinely purchase global releases by paying transactionally immaterial 
plaintiffs’ fees, and when defendants rationally prefer to do so.”). 
 127. See id. (“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum 
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then 
corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for 
intra-entity disputes.”).  
 128. Although the Delaware Court of Chancery had originally stated that forum-selection 
clauses should go in corporate charters, it became far more common for corporations to put 
them into their bylaws. This difference mattered because charter provisions have to be 
adopted by both the board and the shareholders, while bylaws provisions can generally be 
adopted by the board on its own. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) 
(providing that corporations can allow shareholders or the board to amend the bylaws) with 
id. § 242(b) (providing that both the shareholders and the board must approve amendments 
to the charter). As a result, corporations favored putting litigation-limiting procedures in 
their bylaws because they did not have to get their shareholders’ approval.  
 129. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 851, 858 (2016) (noting that “over fifty Delaware corporations adopted fee-
shifting bylaws by April 2015”). 
 130. See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: 
Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate 
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 515-16 (2016) (“[I]t will be difficult for even the largest 
institutional investors to take the risk of paying millions, or tens of millions, of dollars in 
defense attorneys’ fees to correct corporate misconduct when their individual, pro rata share 
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high risks and low rewards made it financially perilous for any shareholder 
to serve as a lead plaintiff, potentially threatening shareholder litigation as 
an enterprise.131  
In June 2015, the Delaware legislature stepped in and barred fee-shifting 
provisions.132 At the same time, however, it expressly permitted forum-
selection clauses in either the charter or the bylaws.133 The legislative 
blessing of forum-selection clauses provided support to Delaware judges 
who were looking to crack down on frivolous merger cases. As discussed in 
the prior section,134 the challenge for these judges has been maintaining 
control over these suits given the wide array of forums in which plaintiffs 
can sue. Without forum selection clauses, plaintiffs who wanted to avoid 
Delaware’s more stringent review of settlements could just file their suit in 
another jurisdiction. Now, assuming that a corporation has adopted a 
forum-selection clause, Delaware could maintain control over the suits and 
reject disclosure-only settlements that do not pass muster under its new 
heightened scrutiny. 
With the Delaware legislature’s approval and the Delaware courts 
standing guard, it seemed like the problem of frivolous merger cases would 
disappear.135 But the reality has not been so simple because defendants still 
have a financial incentive to waive forum selection clauses.136 At first 
glance, this may sound surprising. Why wouldn’t corporations want to be in 
Delaware where the judges are ready to crack down on nuisance 
settlements?  
The answer lies in the incentives that create these settlements in the first 
place. As discussed in Part I, nuisance settlements are so prevalent in the 
                                                                                                                 
of the potential benefit or recovery created by the litigation will only be a fraction of the 
total benefit sought, and when achieving a ‘full remedy’ is not possible absent lengthy 
proceedings.”).  
 131. See id. 
 132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (Supp. 2016) (“The bylaws may not contain any 
provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of 
the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined 
in § 115 of this title.”). 
 133. See id. tit. 8, § 115 (“The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, 
consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate 
claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”). 
 134. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 135. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 2 (noting that, in the wake of Trulia and legislative 
approval of forum-selection bylaws, the problems of merger litigation “appeared to be 
solved”). 
 136. See id. at 3 (stating that defendants have a “continued interest in retaining the option 
of a cheap settlement and a broad release in an alternative jurisdiction”). 
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merger context because they benefit corporate defendants as well as 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.137 If a corporation is going to face litigation, it would 
often favor a quick, cheap resolution of the suit even more than vindication 
after a lengthy and expensive legal battle.138 And even if Delaware 
promises to dismiss frivolous suits quickly, corporations might still prefer 
to litigate the case outside of Delaware where it will get a cheap settlement 
and a global release of all related claims. Corporations are essentially 
buying a release when they settle these claims, and this release may be 
worth the relatively low cost of litigating and settling a nuisance suit.139 As 
a result, even though Delaware stands ready and willing to exercise more 
stringent oversight over merger cases, corporations may not want them to 
do so.  
Faced with this reality, most forum selection clauses allow corporations 
to have their cake and eat it, too. A typical clause might provide that the 
exclusive forum applies “unless the Corporation consents in writing to the 
selection of an alternative forum.”140 Such wording gives corporations a 
choice. They can enforce the provision if they want the claims to be 
reviewed in Delaware under Delaware’s stringent standards. Or they can 
waive the provision if they would rather make a few additional disclosures, 
pay a few hundred thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees, and take their 
release. Early evidence reveals that some corporations are indeed waiving 
these provisions, although it is still too early to determine the extent of this 
trend.141  
This experience shows the drawbacks of relying on corporations as the 
gatekeepers in shareholder lawsuits. Although corporations often rail 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See supra Part I. 
 138. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 14 (“[O]nce the corporation has become a defendant 
in merger litigation, that corporation has a strong incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases 
that disclosure settlements provide.”). 
 139. Cf. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1084 n.142, 1122 (2013) (discussing the value of 
preclusion to defendants).  
 140. See Cox, supra note 90, at 507-08 (“Though there are many varieties of forum-
selection bylaws, the most common provision reflects a preference for the forum of the state 
of incorporation while also according the board of directors authority to ‘waive’ the selected 
forum in favor of another forum where a suit is pending.” (footnote omitted)); Griffith, supra 
note 115, at 2-3 (“[D]efense counsel must be seen as complicit in the out-of-Delaware 
dynamic because they have failed to exercise Exclusive Forum bylaws to bring the litigation 
back to Delaware.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Niedermayer v. Kriegsman, C.A. No. 11800-VCMR (Del. Ch. May 2, 
2016) (oral ruling acknowledging novel issues raised by selective enforcement and waiver of 
a forum selection bylaw). 
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against frivolous claims, the reality is that many corporations like the 
opportunity to buy a release. And even those that do not place significant 
value in a release may still prefer a cheap settlement over litigating the case, 
even in front of a sympathetic judge. In making these decisions, 
corporations will act in their own best interests, even if these decisions do 
not benefit the legal system as a whole.  
Even more concerning, these decisions might reflect other interests 
altogether. As noted above, the board alone can typically adopt a forum 
selection clause if it is in the corporation’s bylaws.142 And regardless of 
whether the clause is in the bylaws or the charter, the board alone decides 
whether to waive it. In nearly all shareholder lawsuits, however, the board 
members are named as defendants. Any board knows that it is the likely 
target of these suits when deciding whether to adopt a forum-selection 
provision, and, in most cases, it is the actual target when deciding whether 
to waive such a provision. It goes against human nature to presume that 
directors will put the corporation’s interests ahead of their own. As a result, 
we should be wary of trusting directors to serve as faithful monitors of the 
corporation’s interests, and much less of the legal system more broadly.  
Judges should keep these concerns in mind when reviewing other types 
of heightened procedures that corporations may include in their charters or 
bylaws. Beyond fee shifting or forum selection, there are other types of 
procedures that enterprising corporations might want to adopt. Could, for 
example, a corporation adopt a minimum ownership requirement, barring 
shareholders from suing unless they own more than a threshold percentage 
of a corporation’s stock?143 Or could a corporation require all shareholder 
suits (or at least shareholder suits filed under state law) to be submitted to 
arbitration, effectively stripping courts of their jurisdiction over these 
claims?144 Or could corporations use still other types of procedures—
heightened pleading, limitations on discovery, or complete bans on non-
                                                                                                                 
 142. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 
BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1676 (2016) (“Boards can presumably adopt alternative approaches 
such as bylaws that require minimum ownership thresholds, limit the scope of available 
damages, or eliminate the availability of fees to prevailing plaintiffs.”). 
 144. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 21, at 33 (“The 800-pound gorilla in the room that 
has yet to be addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws that mandate 
sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration.”); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured 
Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 583 (2016) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act does not require states to uphold 
corporate bylaw or charter provisions mandating that shareholder claims be arbitrated). 
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monetary settlements—to discourage shareholders from challenging board 
actions?145  
The legality of such procedures is still up in the air. The Delaware 
legislature has only addressed fee shifting and forum selection.146 Outside 
of these areas, Delaware has taken a hands-off approach, with the Delaware 
Supreme Court stating that any such procedures are facially valid and will 
be enforceable as long as they are “adopted by the appropriate corporate 
procedures and for a proper corporate purpose,” suggesting a fairly hands-
off approach.147 Few other states have weighed in at all.148 As a result, 
despite the concerns outlined above, corporate boards have wide latitude to 
use procedure to police shareholder claims. As we will see, boards also 
have the ability to oversee other types of shareholder lawsuits, albeit in 
different ways.  
C. Derivative Suits 
The legal system has long struggled with the role of the corporate board 
in derivative suits. On one hand, derivative suits exist because directors are 
frequently named in these suits, and therefore the legal system does not 
trust directors to exercise their normal authority over the corporation. Yet, 
these claims ultimately belong to the corporation, and directors normally 
make decisions on behalf of the corporation. As a result, the law wants to 
both give directors power but also closely monitor how they use it. This 
section outlines the traditional power of the board over derivative suits, as 
well as the role of judges in monitoring how boards exercise this power.  
1. Corporate Boards  
Corporate boards have long been the primary gatekeepers in shareholder 
derivative suits, and for an ostensibly good reason. In a derivative suit, the 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See generally Erickson, supra note 81, at 85-86. 
 146. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(b), 115 (Supp. 2016).  
 147. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). 
 148. Oklahoma recently mandated fee-shifting in all shareholder derivative suits filed in 
the state. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1126 (Supp. 2017) (“In any derivative action instituted by a 
shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon final 
judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party or 
parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a result 
of such action.”). And a few states have addressed forum-selection bylaws. See, e.g., Galaviz 
v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting a forum-selection bylaw 
where the bylaw was adopted after the alleged misconduct). More broadly, however, there is 
little precedent on the limits of litigation-limiting bylaw and charter provisions.  
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corporation is the functional plaintiff.149 Shareholders bring these suits on 
behalf of corporations because directors, who normally decide whether 
corporations should file lawsuits, are often implicated in the alleged 
wrongdoing.150 The law understandably believes that directors cannot 
therefore be trusted to make unbiased decisions regarding the merits of 
these suit.151 The corporation remains the real party in interest, however, 
and any recovery obtained in the suit goes into the corporation’s coffers.152 
Accordingly, derivative suits are an exception to the normal rule that boards 
of directors control corporations.153 Where possible, however, the law tries 
to return power to the board. This effort is reflected in two procedural 
mechanisms—the demand requirement and special litigation committees.  
The demand requirement mandates that, before filing suit, the plaintiff 
make a demand on the corporation’s board of directors, requesting that the 
board itself file the suit.154 This requirement is based on the idea that the 
board may want to bring the lawsuit itself and, if it does, there is no reason 
why this power should be taken away from it.155 From this simple 
requirement, however, comes a whole host of procedural complications. In 
many instances, the board faces a conflict of interest in reviewing the 
plaintiff’s demand. If the directors face a meaningful risk of personal 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See NL Indus., Inc. v. MAXXAM, Inc. (In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. 
S’holders Litig.), 698 A.2d 949, 956 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 150. See Van Gelder v. Taylor, 621 F. Supp. 613, 620 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“As a general 
rule, the plaintiff stockholder in a stockholder’s derivative suit is ‘at best the nominal 
plaintiff.’ The corporation is the real party in interest, regardless of the fact that the corporate 
management has failed to pursue the action.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Liddy v. 
Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 151. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The derivative action 
developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue in the corporation's name where those in 
control of the company refused to assert a claim belonging to it.”). 
 152. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (“In [a derivative 
suit] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation . . . . [A]ny damages recovered . . . are 
paid to the corporation.” (quoting CLARK, supra note 26, at 639-40)). 
 153. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1044 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (“A corporate claim is an asset of the corporation, so authority over the claim 
ordinarily rests with the board of directors.”). 
 154. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity 
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the 
directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Greenburg, 965 A.2d 763, 808 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(stating that the demand requirement “exists to preserve the primacy of board 
decisionmaking regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation”). 
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liability, they almost certainly will not authorize the corporation to file suit 
against them.  
In recognition of this conflict, many states allow shareholders to avoid 
the demand requirement if they can allege with particularity that demand 
would be futile.156 In these states, if the shareholder makes a demand and 
does not allege futility, the shareholder is deemed to have conceded the 
board’s independence.157 If the board then rejects the demand and decides 
not to sue, as is likely, that decision is protected by the business judgment 
rule and is unlikely to be overturned. Put another way, if the shareholder 
makes a demand, the board will likely reject it and the shareholder will not 
be able to sue. As a result, shareholders generally try to avoid the demand 
requirement by alleging that demand would be futile.158 A significant 
number of derivative suits therefore begin with a procedural skirmish over 
demand futility.159  
If the board loses this skirmish, it has one more opportunity to take 
control of the suit. It can form a committee of one or more directors—called 
a special litigation committee (“SLC”)—to review the suit.160 This review 
is different than that of a judge. The main goal of the SLC is not to 
determine whether the claims have merit, although the merits will likely be 
a significant part of the analysis. Instead, it is trying to determine whether 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. 
Ch. 2009) (“Where, as here, a plaintiff does not make a pre-suit demand on the board of 
directors, the complaint must plead with particularity facts showing that a demand on the 
board would have been futile.”). 
 157. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT & DAVID F. CAVERS, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.10, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (stating that, in 
many jurisdictions, “while the directors may ultimately refuse the demand, by making a 
demand the plaintiff may forego the opportunity of testing the availability of excuse”). 
 158. See id.  
 159. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1780-84 (discussing the fights over demand futility 
in derivative suits filed in federal court). Many states have tried to avoid these skirmishes by 
eliminating the futility defense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401(2) (West 2016); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (West 2016). In these states, the demand requirement is 
universal and cannot be avoided. Even here, however, there are fights about the implications 
of the board’s rejection of the demand. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law: 
Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 
973, 999 (2007) (“However, the requirement of universal demand and the Delaware rule 
allowing it to be excused may amount to much the same thing. In a universal demand 
jurisdiction, if a board refuses to sue after a demand, the plaintiff must show by 
particularized pleadings why her derivative suit should go forward. That burden is just like 
the one facing a derivative plaintiff in Delaware who claims that demand should be 
excused.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 160. See DEMOTT & CAVERS, supra note 157, § 5.14.  
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the suit is in the best interests of the corporation.161 This analysis can take 
into account the cost of the litigation, any bad press that might be associated 
with the suit, the impact of the suit on other legal proceedings to which the 
corporation is a party, and any other relevant factors.162 If the SLC decides 
that the suit is in the corporation’s best interests, taking all of these factors 
into account, it can seek to take control of the litigation.163 If it reaches the 
opposite conclusion, it can ask the court to dismiss the suit.164  
Putting the pieces together, the board of directors serves as the primary 
gatekeeper in shareholder derivative suits, with judges closely monitoring 
their actions. The role of judges will be examined in the next subsection, 
but the role of directors is both understandable and somewhat concerning. 
On one hand, it makes sense that the law would rely on corporate boards to 
pass judgment on derivative claims. These claims belong to the corporation, 
and boards are the traditional steward of corporate interest.165 As long as 
directors are able to act independently, the law should defer to them.  
On the other hand, it is questionable whether directors can ever act truly 
independently when it comes to evaluating claims against fellow directors. 
Although SLC members are technically independent—i.e., they are 
generally not named as defendants in the suit—they are still directors 
evaluating claims made against other directors. As a result, they may have a 
“there but for the grace of God go I” feeling when evaluating the claims, 
giving other directors the same benefit of the doubt that they themselves 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(stating that “[a] board may in good faith refuse a shareholder demand to begin litigation 
even if there is substantial basis to conclude that the lawsuit would eventually be successful 
on the merits” because the board may consider, in the exercise of its business judgment, 
whether it “would be excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long-term strategic 
interests”). 
 162. See, e.g., 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, The Delaware Law of 
Corporations and Business Organizations § 13.15 (3d ed. 1997) (listing factors that special 
litigation committee should consider). 
 163. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An 
Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1313 (2009) (“After its investigation, the SLC 
decides whether to pursue the claims, settle them, or seek their dismissal.”). 
 164. See id. (“If the SLC concludes that pressing the claims is not in the best interests of 
the corporation, it will generally produce a written report supporting its conclusion and will 
move on behalf of the corporation to dismiss the claims.”). 
 165. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
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would want if they were ever named in a similar lawsuit.166 Judges evaluate 
SLC recommendations with an increased level of scrutiny,167 but there are 
still concerns that structural bias makes the entire SLC process inherently 
suspect.168  
Moreover, the demand requirement and the SLC process mean that 
shareholders must run a gauntlet of procedural hurdles before they can 
present the substance of their claims. Almost all published opinions in 
derivative litigation concern demand futility or SLC recommendations or 
other procedural battles.169 It is not unusual for a case to proceed for years 
before the court gets to the merits of the claims. The goal of these myriad 
gatekeeping devices is to sort the cases with merit from those without. One 
wonders whether it would be more efficient to dispense with these costly 
procedures and proceed directly to the substance of the claims. This 
question becomes especially acute when one considers the judicial 
resources that these procedures entail. 
2. Judges 
Judges play a particularly important role in derivative litigation. 
Although the legal system depends largely on directors to evaluate the 
derivative claims filed by shareholder plaintiffs, it relies on judges to 
review the decisions made by directors. Put another way, directors monitor 
shareholder plaintiffs, and judges monitor the directors. Yet, as judges 
themselves have pointed out, they are not necessarily well-suited for this 
role.  
This point is highlighted by the role of judges in reviewing SLC 
decisions. As noted above, judges use enhanced scrutiny in reviewing these 
decisions because SLC directors, although technically independent, have a 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787 (Del. 1981). 
 167. See id. (“We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the ‘business judgment’ 
rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper balancing point. While we admit an 
analogy with a normal case respecting board judgment, it seems to us that there is sufficient 
risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case to justify caution beyond 
adherence to the theory of business judgment.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and 
the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305 (2005). 
 169. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2004) (evaluating a claim of demand futility); In 
re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (reviewing an SLC 
decision); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(reviewing a settlement in a derivative suit). 
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structural bias in reviewing claims filed against other directors.170 As a 
result, in Delaware and many other states, the court uses a two-step form of 
review. The Delaware Supreme Court developed this test in Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado.171 First, under Zapata, the court examines the independence 
and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.172 
Second, it determines, “applying its own independent business judgment, 
whether the motion should be granted.”173  
The second step of this test has raised eyebrows. Are judges particularly 
well-suited to apply “their own independent business judgment”? Do most 
judges even have such judgment? Yet, as the Delaware Supreme Court has 
made clear, this test was never meant to give judges a tremendous amount 
of power. Instead, it simply gives judges the flexibility to override an SLC 
decision when something feels “off.” As the Delaware Supreme Court has 
held, “The second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate 
actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy 
its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a 
stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the 
corporation’s interest.”174 There is no expectation, in other words, that 
judges will conduct in-depth reviews of the business merits of SLC 
decisions. 
Yet, this form of review highlights the curious role of judges in 
evaluating derivative claims. Although the law wants directors to be the 
first line of defense against frivolous derivative claims, it also does not fully 
trust them in this role. As a result, the legal system relies on judges to be the 
equivalent of watchdogs, stepping in when a board or SLC’s decision does 
not pass the smell test.  
In this way, judges serve a somewhat different role than that 
contemplated by the PSLRA. Under the PSLRA, judges are supposed to 
apply the standards set out by Congress.175 There will always be some 
discretion in how exactly judges apply these standards, but their discretion 
is still intentionally cabined. Under Zapata, however, judges are supposed 
to be broader protectors of the corporate interest. Their role here is similar 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text. 
 171. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 789. 
 174. See id.  
 175. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, 
the court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of 
paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.” (emphasis added)). 
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to their role in reviewing settlements in derivative suits and class actions 
where they are tasked with ensuring that the settlement is “in the best 
interests” of the class or the plaintiff corporation.176  
This broader role has its own challenges. It is one thing for judges to 
apply discrete legal standards. It is another thing altogether for judges to 
oversee decisions made by others, whether these decisions are SLC requests 
to dismiss a derivative suit or joint requests by the parties to settle the 
derivative suit. It takes a significant amount of time to dig into a case and 
come up with reasons to reject a suggested course of conduct. Given the 
already-significant demands on judges, will most judges find the time 
necessary to perform this oversight role effectively? Or will they simply 
rubberstamp a SLC’s request and get the case off their docket? These 
questions, and the paucity of data available to answer them, challenge the 
notion that judges are the key to solving the problems in shareholder 
lawsuits.  
D. Reflecting on Gatekeepers 
As we have seen, shareholder lawsuits share the same need for 
gatekeepers, yet different types of shareholder lawsuits rely on very 
different gatekeepers. Examining this phenomenon leads to two important 
observations. First, there are good reasons for the differences. Although 
securities class actions, merger cases, and derivative suits all fall under the 
umbrella of shareholder litigation, there are important differences between 
these suits that have influenced the gatekeepers in each. In securities class 
actions, for example, there is often enough money at stake to make it 
economically rational for institutional investors to spend more of their time 
monitoring the litigation.177 In merger cases, the problems got so bad that 
Delaware judges were forced to step in to protect the shareholder litigation 
franchise.178 And in derivative suits, the claims ultimately belong to the 
plaintiff corporation,179 so it is not surprising that the law carves out a role 
for corporate boards to monitor these suits.  
                                                                                                                 
 176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(1)(B); DEL. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a)-(b). 
 177. See Weiss, supra note 55, at 574. 
 178. See, e.g., Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Jurisdictional Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 467, 469 (arguing that Delaware had become a “pariah in shareholder litigation” 
because “[o]ver the past fifteen years, shareholders have spurned the Delaware courts and 
are now likely to file fiduciary lawsuits elsewhere”). 
 179. See NL Indus., Inc. v. MAXXAM, Inc. (In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev. 
S’holders Litig.), 698 A.2d 949, 956 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“A derivative claim belongs to the 
corporation, not to the shareholder plaintiff who brings the action.”). 
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Second, there is no single gatekeeper that solves all problems associated 
with shareholder lawsuits. Each gatekeeper solves some of the problems, 
but creates others. In securities class actions, institutional investors do 
indeed bargain with plaintiffs’ attorneys for lower fees, but they are also 
subject to their own conflicts of interest with law firms trying to curry 
favor.180 In merger cases, Delaware judges can crack down on settlements 
that come before them, but they will have difficulty stopping cases from 
fleeing to other jurisdictions.181 And in derivative suits, corporate boards 
can review derivative claims to determine whether they are in the 
corporation’s interests, but it will be hard to avoid the directors’ own 
interests seeping into this review.182  
As a result, the goal of this comparative effort should not be to 
standardize the gatekeepers across different types of shareholder litigation. 
Nor should we call it a day and be satisfied with the status quo. Instead, we 
should try to take the lessons from these different contexts and see if they 
can have broader applicability. 
III. Toward a Broader Approach to Litigation Gatekeeping 
A. Judges as Enhanced Gatekeepers 
Judges are the first line of defense in shareholder lawsuits. In all class 
actions and derivative suits, judges approve all settlements, decide all 
motions, and preside over all trials.183 In many ways, therefore, judges are 
already valuable gatekeepers in these suits. The experience of merger class 
actions, however, demonstrates that judges can be even more influential, 
dramatically changing the settlement practices in each type of litigation.  
One wonders, therefore, whether judges could similarly act as enhanced 
gatekeepers in derivative suits and securities class actions. Rather than 
rubber-stamping settlements in derivative suits, judge could scrutinize these 
settlements, especially those that involve corporate governance reforms 
rather than monetary consideration. Piggybacking on the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s new standard in reviewing merger settlements, they could then 
reject those derivative settlements that do not offer “plainly material” 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See supra Section II.A. 
 181. See supra Section II.B. 
 182. See supra Section II.C. 
 183. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 23.1(c) (requiring judges to approve settlements in 
class actions in derivative suits). In Delaware, judges preside over all trials in the Chancery 
Court. In other jurisdictions, the claims may be decided by a jury, but the judge will still 
preside over the trial.  
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benefits for the plaintiff corporation and/or its shareholders.184 Similarly, 
judges could adopt a rebuttable presumption against non-monetary 
settlements, forcing litigants to explain precisely how the settlement is 
beneficial.185  
In securities class actions, the concerns are different, relating to conflicts 
of interest involving institutional plaintiffs, not non-monetary settlements. 
Nonetheless, judges could bring comparable oversight to these conflicts of 
interests, asking tough questions about the financial relationships between 
institutional investors and their attorneys. For example, in reviewing lead 
counsel petitions, judges could require applicants to complete standardized 
disclosure forms that include, among other things, information regarding 
any campaign contributions or other types of payments made by the 
applicants’ law firms to the plaintiff or any individual who controls the 
plaintiff.186 Alternatively, judges could ask about these relationships during 
hearings, making clear that any plausible conflicts of interests will bar a 
shareholder from serving as lead plaintiff. To the extent that sunshine is the 
best disinfectant, this oversight could reduce unethical practices.  
This is not to say that judicial oversight is an easy panacea in either type 
of litigation. It is hard for individual judges to make systematic changes in 
the way these suits are litigated. Individual judges can reject poor-quality 
settlements presented to them, but it would take collective action from a 
significant number of judges to make a real difference in these suits. This 
collective action would be difficult to pull off. Judges work largely 
independently, and they handle civil and criminal cases in a variety of 
areas. It is difficult for them to know the enforcement problems in any 
particular area of the law, much less the specific steps taken by individual 
judges to try to combat these problems.  
This collective action is especially challenging given that derivative suits 
and securities class actions are spread throughout the country. Delaware 
judges were able to crack down on abusive practices in merger litigation 
because a majority of merger cases were filed in Delaware.187 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 185. Cf. Griffith, supra note 25, at 47 (“[I]n cases where corporate benefit is recognized, 
courts should conduct a more rigorous inquiry into how the benefit was created.”). 
 186. I suggested a similar form of standard disclosures in an earlier article. See Jessica 
M. Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
1089, 1134-37 (2013). 
 187. SINHA, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that in the first three quarters of 2015, plaintiffs 
filed seventy-four percent of cases challenging mergers in Delaware, although that 
percentage dropped sharply since the decision in Trulia). 
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Delaware had to struggle (and still struggles) to keep these cases,188 they 
always maintained enough influence that lawyers had to pay close attention 
to their opinions. In contrast, securities class actions are filed in federal 
district courts across the country, and derivative suits can often be filed in 
state or federal court. These cases are overrepresented in certain 
geographical areas, but no state or court has the same influence that 
Delaware has over merger cases. 
These challenges, however, should not deter judges from trying to serve 
as more active gatekeepers. First, individual judges can be influential. 
Judge Jed Rakoff’s rejection of the corporate settlements with the Securities 
& Exchange Commission, for example, influenced the SEC’s practices 
more broadly, revealing the power that one judge armed with good 
questions can have.189 Moreover, judges in certain districts or courts can 
work together, announcing greater scrutiny in the cases that collectively 
come before them. Nearly sixty percent of securities class actions are filed 
in the Ninth and Second Circuits.190 Any rule announced in these circuits 
would undoubtedly have reverberations throughout the country.  
Derivative suits are also concentrated in these two circuits,191 although 
they are likely more dispersed than securities class actions given that they 
can be filed in state or federal court.192 Nonetheless, a few judges publicly 
critiquing practices in these suits and announcing new gatekeeping 
practices would likely get widespread attention. It would also give 
ammunition to shareholder objectors who could spread the message to other 
courts.  
Greater judicial oversight is unlikely to completely solve the problems in 
securities class actions or derivative suits. It would, however, bolster efforts 
by other gatekeepers to crack down on the problems in these lawsuits. As 
we will see, corporate boards and shareholders could also play a more 
significant role.  
                                                                                                                 
 188. See id. See generally Griffith, supra note 115 (describing Delaware’s often 
unsuccessful struggle to retain control over merger cases). 
 189. .See Matthew G. Neumann, Note, Neither Admit Nor Deny: Recent Changes to the 
Securities & Exchange Commission’s Longstanding Settlement Policy, 40 J. CORP. L. 793, 
794 (2015) (noting that Judge Rakoff’s pushback on SEC settlement practices prompted the 
SEC to change its practices).  
 190. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2015 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 27 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-
Action-Filings-2015-Year-in-Review. 
 191. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1764 (finding that more than half of federal 
derivative suits are filed in the Second or Ninth Circuits).  
 192. See id. (examining research on derivative suits filed in both state and federal courts).  
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B. Corporate Boards and Shareholders as Enhanced Gatekeepers 
A second possibility for enhanced gatekeeping is through self-help. 
Corporate boards and shareholders may be able to make greater use of 
bylaw and charter amendments to protect themselves against frivolous 
shareholder lawsuits. As detailed above in Part II, corporate boards and 
shareholders have already started to use these amendments to limit merger 
litigation.193 A significant number of companies have adopted bylaw or 
charter amendments specifying that any intra-corporate dispute, including 
fiduciary duty claims, must be filed in Delaware.194 Several companies 
similarly adopted fee-shifting bylaws and charter amendments before they 
were barred by the Delaware General Assembly.195 A few companies are 
also experimenting with other types of bylaw and charter amendments.196 
Collectively, these amendments have succeeded in bringing a significant 
percentage of merger cases back to Delaware and perhaps also in 
discouraging the filing of meritless challenges to mergers.  
The question now is whether these amendments can have a similar 
impact in other types of shareholder litigation. Many of these provisions 
already cover shareholder derivative suits because they are worded broadly 
to include all fiduciary duty litigation.197 And some are written even more 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 194. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 196. Soon after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld fee-shifting bylaws in ATP Tours, 
four related companies announced bylaws prohibiting its stockholders from initiating a 
direct or derivative claim unless the claiming stockholder delivers to the corporate secretary 
written consent by beneficial stockholders owning at least three percent of the outstanding 
shares. See, e.g., Imperial Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 3.2 (Nov. 3, 
2014).  
 197. See, e.g., CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS 
AND BYLAWS (Jan. 15, 2012), https://www.kattenlaw.com/Files/45103_Jan_%202012_ 
Forum_Study.pdf (noting that the model forum selection bylaw typically covers (i) “any 
derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the corporation”, (ii) “any action asserting 
a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer to the corporation or its 
stockholders”, (iii) “any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law”, or (iv) “any action asserting a claim governed by the 
internal affairs doctrine”); Shareholder Suit Challenging Groundbreaking Minimum-Support-
to-Sue Bylaw Dismissed, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.foley. 
com/shareholder-suit-challenging-groundbreaking-minimum-support-to-sue-bylaw-dismissed-
10-19-2015/ (providing language of minimum ownership bylaw that covers any claim “on 
behalf of (1) the corporation and/or (2) any class of current and/or prior shareholders against 
the corporation and/or against any director and/or officer of the corporation in his or her official 
capacity”).  
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broadly, sweeping in all claims filed by shareholders against the 
corporation, including securities class actions.198 As a result, efforts by 
corporations and shareholders to limit frivolous merger claims may have 
spillover efforts on derivative suits and securities class actions. And the fact 
that corporations have started to use bylaw and charter amendments in the 
merger context may prompt them to consider using these amendments in 
other types of shareholder lawsuits.  
Nonetheless, there are particular challenges in relying on bylaw and 
charter amendments in securities class actions and derivative suits. First, it 
is unlikely that this form of self-help will become as common outside of the 
merger context. Merger cases are especially well-suited for such self-help. 
When a company is contemplating a merger or acquisition, it knows that it 
will likely be sued.199 It also must often amend its charter and/or bylaws as 
part of the transaction.200 As a result, the company knows that it is a target, 
and it is relatively easy for the company to protect itself.  
In contrast, derivative suits and securities class actions are usually filed 
in the immediate aftermath of revelations of bad news.201 This bad news 
typically is not easy to predict, making it difficult for the corporation to 
amend its governing documents beforehand. Amending protective 
provisions as soon as the bad news is announced would likely draw even 
more negative attention to the company. In addition, these revelations will 
likely occur at times when the company is not otherwise planning to amend 
its bylaws or charter, so doing so would take special effort.  
Second, the types of provisions used in the merger context may not be 
the best fit for derivative suits or securities class actions. In the merger 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersection of Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Securities 
Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 388-89 (2015) (discussing a fee-shifting bylaw that 
covered both state and federal claims); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Delaware Throws a 
Curveball, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/BE9G-S8CE (noting that 
Delaware’s prohibition against fee-shifting bylaw and charter provisions does not cover 
securities class actions).  
 199. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of merger 
litigation).  
 200. See, e.g., Robert B. Little, “Exclusive Forum” Bylaws Fast Becoming an Item in 
M&A Deals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2015), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/13/exclusive-forum-bylaws-fast-becoming-an-item-in-ma-
deals/ (“Public company M&A targets that do not already have such bylaws in place should 
consider adopting them concurrently with the announcement of a deal.”). 
 201. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical 
Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 58 (2011) (nothing that shareholder derivative suits are 
frequently filed in the wake of a “discrete event such as an accounting error or an alleged 
misstatement to the market”). 
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context, the chief goal of these provisions was to bring the cases back to 
Delaware where Delaware judges could scrutinize the claims and the 
settlements.202 In derivative suits, there is not a single forum that offers 
such benefits. Delaware could start to monitor these suits more closely, but 
so far it has not shown much inclination to do so.203 And there is good 
reason for most derivative suits to be filed outside of Delaware. These suits 
often arise out of the same series of events as a parallel securities class 
action, and therefore there are efficiencies in allowing the two suits to 
proceed in the same jurisdiction before the same judge.204 The federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all securities class actions,205 and 
therefore, forcing derivative suits into Delaware court would eliminate 
these efficiencies. Nor is there a specific federal court where judges are 
more likely to provide greater oversight of these claims. As a result, a 
forum-selection bylaw may not be the best way to improve derivative suits 
or securities class actions.  
There may be other types of provisions, however, that would allow 
corporations and their shareholders to crack down on frivolous derivative or 
securities claims. The legal system is still largely in unchartered waters 
when it comes to bylaw or charter provisions designed to limit litigation.206 
For example, can corporations adopt minimum ownership requirements, 
limiting which shareholders are allowed to file derivative suits or class 
actions? Can they change the pleading standards or put new limitations on 
discovery? Can they police non-monetary settlements? In Delaware, at 
least, the answer appears to be yes, assuming that they are adopted for a 
proper corporate purpose.207 This judicial deference gives corporations 
ample room to engage in self-help through litigation-limiting bylaw or 
charter amendments.  
Yet, there are dangers in relying on corporations to be the primary 
gatekeeper in shareholder lawsuits. For the most part, corporate boards can 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text. 
 203. There has been no equivalent of Trulia in the derivative suit context. There are a few 
instances of Delaware judges rejecting proposed settlements in derivative suits, but these 
cases are the exception. See, e.g., Smollar v. Potarazu, C.A. No. 10287-VCN (Del. Ch. Jan. 
14, 2016) (rejecting a settlement in a derivative suit where the plaintiff had negotiated a 
separate benefit not shared by the corporation or the other shareholders).  
 204. Erickson, supra note 201, at 80 (arguing that “many shareholder derivative suits 
may simply serve as tagalong suits to other types of corporate litigation,” especially 
securities class actions).  
 205. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (2012).  
 206. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.  
 207. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014). 
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adopt bylaw provisions on their own, without shareholder approval.208 
Directors know that they are the likely defendants in any future shareholder 
lawsuit. It is inevitable, therefore, that their own self-interest will influence 
their decision making, especially as they consider proposed amendments 
that will make it more difficult for them to be sued.  
This fact should prompt caution among those optimistic about the 
promise of self-help options. For obvious reasons, directors are not 
unbiased decision makers when it comes to deciding if the corporation 
should be able to sue them. The legal system has already recognized this 
exact point in derivative suits. The law allows corporate boards to review 
shareholder demands and then form an SLC to review the lawsuit as a 
whole, but it also subjects these decisions that emerge from such reviews to 
enhanced scrutiny.209 SLC decisions are not entitled to the business 
judgment rule precisely because of concerns about possible unconscious 
biases.210 These same biases should cause judges to proceed cautiously 
when reviewing litigation-limiting bylaws.  
This does not mean that corporations should never be able to engage in 
self-help when it comes to shareholder litigation. First, if shareholders 
approve the provision either through a charter amendment or through a 
shareholder-approved bylaw amendment, there is less cause for concern.211 
Shareholders may not be perfect judges of the right procedure in 
shareholder lawsuits, but they do not suffer from the same biases as 
directors. Instead, their interests are perfectly aligned with the 
corporation—they only want the corporation to sue when the suit would be 
financially advantageous.  
Second, if the board alone adopts the provisions through a bylaw 
amendment, courts should use greater scrutiny. This scrutiny can build on 
the enhanced review already used in derivative suits.212 This review should 
not be fatal to all litigation-limiting bylaws, but courts should closely 
examine whether the procedures are likely to be effective in sorting 
meritorious claims from meritless ones. Procedures designed to curtail 
shareholder suits across the board, without regard to the merit of the claims, 
should be rejected. In short, the legal system should allow corporate boards 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (providing that corporations can allow 
shareholders or the board to amend the bylaws).  
 209. See supra notes 154-169 and accompanying text.  
 210. See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.  
 211. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing how charter amendments 
must be approved by both shareholders and the board).  
 212. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787 (Del. 1981). 
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to be active gatekeepers in shareholder lawsuits, but only under the careful 
supervision of the courts.  
C. Legislatures as Enhanced Gatekeepers 
Legislatures have traditionally played only a small gatekeeping role in 
shareholder litigation. Aside from the PSLRA, Congress has rarely 
interjected itself into the fray of these suits. State legislatures have played a 
slightly greater role, but even they have not been active gatekeepers.213 
These lawmakers could build on the lessons of the PSLRA and explore new 
legislation to police shareholder lawsuits, including legislation that would 
improve the gatekeeping abilities of other players in these suits.  
 At the federal level, for example, Congress could amend the PSLRA to 
require greater disclosures by shareholders applying to serve as lead 
plaintiffs. Under the PSLRA as it is currently written, shareholders only 
need to disclose their financial stake in the litigation as well as their past 
participation in other shareholder lawsuits.214 Congress could ensure that 
courts are in a better position to evaluate shareholder applicants by 
requiring shareholders to disclose any financial relationship with their 
counsel, including campaign contributions. It could also require 
shareholders to disclose fee arrangements they have made with their 
counsel, giving judges a way to know if shareholders are taking advantage 
of their bargaining power to protect class interests.  
Similarly, at either the state or federal level, legislatures could serve as 
gatekeepers over litigation-limiting bylaw and charter provisions. Corporate 
boards and shareholders have an interest in using governance documents to 
limit frivolous litigation, but neither are perfectly positioned to be the sole 
arbiters of these suits. Boards have inherent conflicts of interest, while 
shareholders may not be sufficiently informed to know the costs and 
benefits of different procedural tools.  
Legislatures, and the rulemaking committees that support them, can 
assist in this role.215 Rather than allowing corporations to adopt any 
provisions they want, legislatures could come up with a menu of 
acceptable, procedural provisions that corporations can include in their 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2) (2012).  
 215. See 1 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440 (rev. 
Sept. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-
procedures-governing-work-rules-committees-0 (describing work of the Judicial 
Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its Advisory Rules 
Committees).  
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bylaws or charters. The ultimate decision of whether to adopt these 
provisions would remain with the corporation, but the legislature would 
ensure that the provisions available effectively sort the good cases from the 
bad.  
This approach may reduce some of the bias in procedural rulemaking. 
Lawmakers do not have the same conflicts of interest as corporate directors 
in reviewing new procedures. And they can draw on the expertise of judges, 
lawyers, and academics who know more about the pros and cons of various 
procedures than do corporate directors. This is especially true if lawmakers 
work through the traditional rulemaking process, which seeks input from a 
variety of constituencies before implementing new rules.216 This approach 
to procedure is far less likely to lead to biased procedures than corporate 
directors drafting the procedures that will later govern suits filed against 
them.  
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the promise of 
legislative gatekeeping. First, lawmakers suffer from their own biases, as 
the PSLRA demonstrated.217 Although the public may wish that lawmakers 
crafted impartial solutions to thorny problems, the reality is messier. 
Lawmakers often act with less nuance, and more partisan jockeying, than 
procedural experts might desire. In the end, politics comes into procedural 
drafting, just as it comes into everything else that legislatures do.  
Second, legislatures may not be anxious to wade into the procedural fray. 
In Delaware, for example, the General Assembly largely leaves corporate 
law to the Delaware bar, relying on a committee of lawyers to propose and 
review amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law.218 This 
committee took more than a year to ban fee-shifting bylaws and charter 
provisions, despite the strong argument that these provisions could be fatal 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See How the Rule Making Process Works, U.S. COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited May 
27, 2017) (describing the process for amending federal procedural rules).  
 217. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 717, 732 (1996) (describing Congress’s selective use of anecdotes in compiling a 
record to support the PSLRA); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, 
Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of 
Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 1140 (2005) (describing Congress’s view toward 
securities class actions when it passed the PSLRA as “more hostile than welcoming”).  
 218. See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 48 (2014) (“As 
is well-known to insiders but surprising to everyone else, the Council of Corporation Law, a 
group of 27 well-respected attorneys mostly from prominent Wilmington firms, proposes all 
amendments to the DGCL. The Council writes the corporate law of Delaware and, by 
extension, the country.” (footnote omitted)). 
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to shareholder litigation more broadly.219 It seems unlikely that the 
Delaware legislature would take on a wholesale review of litigation-
limiting procedures. In other states, litigation-limiting bylaws or charter 
amendments are not on current agendas, and there is no indication that 
other states want to be leaders in this area. As a result, while legislatures 
could play a more significant gatekeeping role, it is questionable whether 
they in fact have the inclination to do so. 
In the end, there is no perfect gatekeeper when it comes to shareholder 
litigation. This point, however, bolsters the argument in favor of multiple 
gatekeepers. Rather than relying on judges or shareholders or legislatures to 
single-handedly monitor shareholder lawsuits, the legal system should think 
more broadly. Different gatekeepers can work together to ensure that these 
lawsuits reflect the best interests of shareholders. 
Conclusion 
Corporate law is all about agency costs. Within the world of shareholder 
litigation, the question is how to make plaintiffs’ attorneys act in the best 
interests of shareholders—a problem that is common to all types of 
shareholder lawsuits. Yet, as this Article demonstrates, different types of 
shareholder lawsuits rely on very different gatekeepers to control agency 
costs. Securities class actions rely on institutional plaintiffs and Congress. 
Merger cases rely on judges and litigation-limiting provisions in corporate 
bylaws and charters. And derivative suits rely largely on corporate boards. 
On their own, however, none of these gatekeepers have been able to solve 
the problems inherent in shareholder litigation.  
This Article advocates a broader approach to litigation gatekeeping. 
Rather than relying on a narrow gatekeeping model, the legal system should 
explore the possibility of using a broader range of gatekeepers to control 
agency costs. Judges should use closer scrutiny in reviewing proposed 
settlements in all types of shareholder lawsuits. Corporate boards and 
shareholders should make greater use of their bylaws and charters. And 
legislatures should explore the use of heightened procedure to cut down on 
frivolous lawsuits. No single gatekeeper is the answer, but together, they 
may be able to solve the oldest problem in corporate law. 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection 
Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/TP2C-8YJ3 
(describing the process leading up to the legislation).  
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